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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROCKET MINING CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, and PIONEER
CARISSA GOLD MINES, INC., a
Wyoming corporation,
Plaintifts-Appellants,
vs.
RULAN J. GILL, LENORE lVI. GILL,
RAY GILL, ANGELO M. BILLIS,
HERMAN F. LUND and T. W.
BILLIS,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

12174

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND
SUPPORTING BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
PETITION FOR REHEARING
COME NOW the Appellants above named, by and
through their attorney, and pursuant to Rule 76(e)(l)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Prooedure, respectfully petition
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah for a rehearing in
the above entitled case on the following grounds:
1. Because the abov,e entitled case was a proceeding
in equity, the Court should review both the law and the
facts, and a rehearing is necessary to resolve a misappre-

2
hension as to facts pres·ently before the Court in this appeal
and material to its decision but apparently overlooked in
its consideration of the problem.
2. In its decision rendered April 8, 1971, the Court
stated that although Rocket's Articles of Incorporation authoriz·ed a board of seven directors, three directors had
never been elected and consequently the four directors in
office would constitute the full board, and three would be
a lawful quorum for the conduct of business. Thus, the
Court held that the action taken by a majority of those
four directors at the meeting of December 26, 1957 wherein
the $130,000 was disbursed was proper becaus·e a lawful
quorum was present even if one director was interested in
the matter under consideration.
3. It is clear from the Record that at the annual
stockholders' meeting on July 17, 1956, the stockholders of
Rocket authorized a board of seven directors, elected four
and left three vacancies to be filled by the directors elected.
(R-298, Ex. P-2, Min. 7-17-56.)
4. The incumbent directors never filled the three
vacancies.

'5. On February 27, 1957, the articles of incorporation
of Rocket were amended to provide for a board of seven
directors. (R-298, Ex. P-7, Min. 2-27-57.)
6. At the annual stockholders' meeting on June 18,
1957, the stockholders elected six ( 6) directors. ( R-23-24,
:Ex. P-2, Min. 6-18-57 on page 73 of Minute Book.) No

mention is made in the minutes of any vacancy remaining
to be filled.
7. Consequently at the meeting of December 26, 1957
four directors would be required in order to form a quorum.
Only four were present. If one of said directors were personally interested in the matter under consideration then
there could be no lawful quorum because the three remaining directors would not be a majority of the six directors
then in office as elected by the stockholders at the preceding annual meeting.
8. The applicable Utah Statute, Section 16-10-38 U.
C. A. (1953) which provides the general quorum rules,
when considered together with the case law rule that an
interested director cannot be counted to form a quorum
shows absolutely that even under the Court's rationale
there could at most be three directors of an elected board
of six and consequently there could be no lawful quorum
present on December 26, 1957 when Appellants acted to
disburse the $130,000.
9. Thus, any action to disburse the $130,000 by those
three directors at the meeting of December 26, 1957 was
patently unlawful.
10. This Court has twice considered the facts pertaining to the directors' meeting of December 26, 1957 and
has twice rendered its written opinions concerning those
facts. In its opinion of July 27, 1966, ( 18 Utah 2d 104, 417
P. 2d 120 ( 1966)) this court noted that the present respondents who had "absolute control of the corporation"
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at that time, acted unlawfully "at the expense of unsuspecting and un-notified stockholders" and induced a "controlled
board of directors to bail them out." In its present decision
rendered April 8, 1971, this Court states on page 2 that
there was an "absence of showing of fraud or chicanery of
some sort." Essentially the same evidence was before the
Court on both occasions as to the facts pertaining to the
said directors' meeting in regard to the disbursement of
the $130,000, and this Court has rendered conflicting decisions on the same. It is submitted that the Court should
resolve this conflict in its decisions.
Respectfully Submitted,
WALTER P. FABER, JR.
Attorney for Appellants

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WHERE THE STATUTE REQUIRES A MAJORITY OF THE NUMBER OF DIRECTORS
AS STATED IN THE ARTICLES TO FORM A
QUORUM AND SIX DIRECTORS HAD BEEN
ELECTED, FOUR DIRECTORS COULD NOT
CONSTITUTE A LAWFUL QUORUM IF ONE
OF THE FOUR HAD A PERSON AL INTEREST
IN THE MATTER BEING CONSIDERED.
The Utah statute pertaining to the number of directors
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constituting a quorum is Section 16-10-38, U. C. A. (Repl.
Vol. 1953), which states as follows:
A majority of the number of directors fixed by the
bylaws, or in the absence of a bylaw fixing the number of directors, then of the number stated in the
articles of incorporation, shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business unless a greater number is required by the articles of incorporation or
the bylaws. The act of a majority of the directors
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present
shall be the act of the board of directors, unless the
act of a greater number is required by the articles
of incorporation or the bylaws.
It is undisputed that seven directors were required to

constitute a full board for Rocket. It is also undisputed
that six directors had been elected and that only four directors of Rocket were present at the meeting of December
26, 1957. The difficulty arises because of the nature of the
action taken and the identity and interests of those four
directors. At the meeting of December 26, 1957, at which
the $130,000 was authorized to be disbursed, the directors
present were R. J. Gill, Lenore Gill, Ray Gill and T. W.
Billis. Of the $130,000, R. J. Gill was to and did receive
approximately $42,000, and A. M. Billis was to and did receive approximately $35,000. Of the directors present at
that meeting, R. J. Gill and Lenore Gill were husband and
wife, and Ray Gill was the father of R. J. Gill. T. W. Billis
was the brother of A. M. Billis.
In its decision this Court accepted the proposition that

a director who has an adverse interest cannot be counted
to form a quorum and cited 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations,
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Section 1128. The above rule of law together with the Utah
statute absolutely determine the issues in favor of Appellants.
In support of its position the Court appeared to base
its present opinion on a holding that there was an absence
of a showing of any fraud or chicanery by plaintiffs. In
that regard it is pertinent to compare the Court's prior decision in 1966, 18 Utah 2d 104, 417 P. 2d 120 (1956) with
its present opinion and note certain facts which the Court
apparently overlooked in making its current decision. On
the question of "fraud or chicanery" it seems without doubt
that the 1966 opinion rendered by this Court is more consistent with the evidence presented than the present decision. Certainly, the very fact that defendants sold their entire majority interest in a public corporation for apparently
less than $6,000 (R-571) when the corporation supposedly
had a net value above liabilities of approximately $500,000
(Ex. P-11) is at least some indication of improper dealing.
Moreover, the defendant R. J. Gill did not know the amount
he sold his stock for, had no records and did not call a corporate meeting to authorize the transfer of defendants'
controlling interest in Rocket. (See R-393-94, 571.)
The present decision implies that there would be a
question about the applicability of the statute of limitations
if the case had not been resolved on the merits by the trial
court. This inference creates another conflict with the
1966 decision. The question about the statute of limitations
was necessarily resolved by this Court's 1966 decision,
otherwise the 1966 decision would have to have been re-
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solved in favor of defendants because the illegal salaries
were approved at an even earlier meeting than the meeting
of December 26, 1957, and the present action included when
it was filed both the question of the illegal salaries and the
unlawful disbursement of the $130,000.
In addition, the Court concluded its most recent opinion by stating that the actions about which plaintiffs complain occurred prior to the time plaintiffs obtained an interest in the corporation. This seems to imply that even
if there were wrong doing it was none of plaintiffs' affair.
However, plaintiffs did have an interest as is shown by
the evidence presented to the Court. Plaintiff Pioneer
Carissa's contract to sell its assets to Rocket took place in
December, 1956. (R-298, Min. 11-7-56.) Pioneer at that
time became a shareholder of Rocket. Rocket never fulfilled its contract to Pioneer after it took over Pioneer's
assets in 1956 and Pioneer obtained a judgment against
Rocket in the federal court in 1960. (R-298, Ex. D-29,
R-420.)
It is interesting to note that the so-called "interest free

loans" the Court refers to apparently provided defendants
with illegal salaries because Rocket's operations were never
on a paying basis. (See 1966 decision.) Moreover, as to
each of the original issues presented to the Court, it is
apparent from the evidence that defendants manipulated
the corporation to their own ends. It is submitted that
when the issues and evidence are considered together the
Court's 1966 opinion as to the evidence is more applicable
than the present decision.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that when all of the evidence is reviewed as a whole and the present plaintiffs' interest as
a shareholder on December 26, 1957 is acknowledged the
"fraud and chicanery" against plaintiffs is apparent. Notwithstanding any fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, however, it appears as a matter of law plaintiffs are entitled
to judgment for the $130,000 because there was no lawful
quorum present when the same was disbursed. In addition, when the apparent fraud and the fact there was no
lawful quorum are considered together and in conjunction
with a controlled board of directors the plaintiffs are
clearly entitled to judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER P. FABER, JR.
Attorney for Appellants
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